Plato, Cicero and the Right to Private Property
In modern times, we generally take for granted that all citizens have a right to private property, but this has not always been the case. There was an ongoing debate in the ancient world regarding the possession of property among the ruling classes of society, Plato argued that private property would only cause corruption and greed, while Cicero argued that property would not only sustain the ruling class, but also improve their skills of governance and tie them to the state. Both of their works were directed towards the ways those who rule society should act, the senators and aristocrats of Rome can be compared to Plato’s class of Guardians, in this sense. Plato’s Republic details the functions and procedures of the ruling class, the Guardians, while Cicero’s De Officiis is addressed to young Roman aristocrats looking to become good politicians. Plato believes that private property is a detriment to good governance, while Cicero believes it can be an indispensable tool of statesmanship. In order to avoid the current bias in favour of private property, it will be fruitful to examine the politics of the times Plato and Cicero inhabited. I think Plato had a strong argument on the matter and offers a unique perspective that we often do not consider today. Shared or communal property among the ruling class of a society would be an effective method of discouraging corruption. The possession of property or wealth by the powerful only encourages those in power to obtain more of it.
I will start by examining Plato’s arguments on communal property and apply it to his political circumstances. Plato argued that governments, over time, will devolve into tyrannies regardless of their original form (545c-546). This devolving is a result of the inherent flaws that are present in the political systems that proceed them, in a cyclical nature. However, the Republic that Plato suggests would mitigate these issues as best as possible and the elimination of private property, including the household, among the ruling class is considered an effective deterrent of corrupt politicians. In his view, private property raises issues regarding self-interested activity and that in order to avoid pursuits based on greed and material wealth, collective property is required (462b-c). In the Ancient Mediterranean, property was often someone’s most valuable possession and it was also a source of income which was highly coveted. In order to survive and sustain themselves, the Guardians “… must receive as an agreed stipend from the other citizens as the wages of their guardianship,” (417a). By removing private property as a source of income, status and wealth, the Guardians in the Republic have no choice but to be entirely focused on the polis, for it will become the primary source of their livelihood and their position in society (417a-b). The removal of the physical property of those in power would not only discourage those motivated by greed, but it would also prevent the pursuit of wealth at the detriment of good ruling. Apart from physical possessions, other possessions such as family are also removed from politicians in Plato’s Republic. The entirety of the household was considered the property of man at the head of the family, therefore making it property. The removal of the family unit means that the love one directs towards one’s family will now be directed to the entirety of the Guardian class and the city as a whole, since Guardians will not know which of the children are potentially theirs (464e-465a). As Plato argues, the Guardians will be free of suffering and pain that comes with owning private property, there is disappointment, the feeling of loss and other afflictions that affect only those who are in possession of property, and these get in the way of good governance (465a-465b). The removal of the right to private property among the ruling class, in all forms, will guarantee that the improvement of the city becomes the only objective for the Guardians; instead of pursuing wealth, status or family, they will now only have one primary focus, that of the state (465, 543b-c). Those who wish to become a politician for unhonourable reasons will be deterred by the harsh restrictions placed on the ruling class and the combination of these two results will ensure a very stable, constant government where corruption or bad governance is extremely rare and clearly not the norm.
The primary issue with Plato’s argument is the reliance on the Noble Lie, which is not guaranteed to be effective nor is it ensured to be enough to guarantee the complacency of the lower classes of the Republic. This is because they will be forced to provide for the Guardians so that they will have no need for property to sustain themselves. The Noble Lie can easily become a tool of the ruling class to achieve the property that they had one been denied, instead of collective governance, it can become a tyranny of the many. Plato had predicted this, however, and argued that any system of government, regardless of its conception, is liable to degrading and eventually collapsing. One example he uses is the rise of tyranny that is made possible by the democratic system that proceeds it (545c-546). Therefore, the possible collapse of the Republic alone is not enough to dismiss Plato’s previous points because it can be argued that any form of government with private property among the politicians would also eventually result in a degradation and collapse. If this phenomenon is present in all forms of governance, it cannot be used as a method of discrediting the Republic. This flaw, being the Noble Lie, does not affect the efficiency of ruling throughout the duration of the Republic which, by using collective property, manages to significantly reduce the corruption of officials while optimizing their focus on governance. As previously stated, the Guardians’ reliance on the population they govern, and their reliance on the Guardians ensures a mutually beneficial relationship, regardless of the Noble Lie. The purpose of this essay is not necessarily to determine which government type would last the longest, but rather seeks to determine if removing the right to private property for the ruling class will make them more effective rulers and less likely to turn to corruption.
Cicero’s view of property is in direct opposition to Plato’s. He argues that the ownership and management of properties is indispensable for statesmen and that it teaches values of responsibility and management (De Officiis, 25–56). He argued that one of the state’s primary roles is to protect private property and that private property is not a part of natural law, but is rather one of the essential foundations of society (13–14). The basis of the argument rests on the fact that without land, politicians will resort to stealing from the wealthy, and they will use their political power to obtain wealth through redistribution or confiscation (20). On the other hand, he states that it is one’s duty to make money, amass properties and be productive, but only through honourable means (60). Therefore, he suggests that a politician must be moderate as he pursues wealth, and that as long as no harm is done in the process of amassing wealth, then there is no issue with the private property of the politician (16). The role of private property in Cicero’s political view is two-fold: it serves as a way of tying politicians to the state and it also ensures that they have income and the proper means of sustaining themselves. A politician is more likely to defend his estates if his wealth and property are at risk if he fails as a politician, and so in a martial society based on warfare, it makes sense to some degree. This political system is self-reliant, and as long as the politicians remain wealthy, they will continue to uphold the state, unlike Plato’s Republic, which relies heavily on indoctrination and the acceptance of the Noble Lie as a basis of society. For Cicero, the wealthy politicians will keep each other in check and those who perform the best will govern, in a hyper-competitive system that seeks to determine the best rulers, governance will inherently be done by those that the society consider the best.
Cicero’s arguments are flawed for a variety of reasons but the primary one being the assumption that politicians will practice moderation when it comes to their wealth. Cicero offers no methods for preventing the abuse of political power aside from the vague definition of acting with “honor,” (89) which is not sufficient enough to justify allowing private property for the politicians. He himself even admits that most individuals with wealth take “delight in … an elegant and profuse style of living … [with] an unbounded desire for money.” (16). Protecting the private property of individuals is one of the primary roles of the state and since those who run the state are in possession of large amounts of private property, they would naturally go to any end in order to protect their possessions. If politicians rule for themselves instead of the state, it cannot be considered good governance since they are not considering those which they are allegedly responsible for. This argument would justify politicians taking nearly any means, as long as they are considered “honorable” (60) to protect their private property and that of their fellow aristocrats. Ultimately, Cicero’s views on private property ensures that politicians are not loyal to the state for the sake of the state but are rather loyal to the state because it ensures their property. In ensuring the state, they also protect their amassed wealth. There are no guarantees or limits to corruption and wealthy landowners will have to decide how to limit each other. In seeking to identify which system will create politicians who are less likely to turn to corruption, Cicero’s system simply presents too many uncertainties. Plato provides checks and balances to try and mitigate the corruption that comes with governance, Cicero places the responsibility on the individual, with no systematic method to prevent corruption or bad governance.
The reason that private property should be abolished among the ruling class is two-fold, but revolves around the concept of creating better politicians with less tendency to resort to corruption or greed. Those who ruled in the times of Plato and Cicero were not paid wages or salaries as they are today; apart from their profession as a politician, they also had to make enough money to support themselves and their families, which inherently creates a desire to make more. It is unlikely that any politician with immense power would not then use their position in society to achieve the money they need to survive. This is evident in historical sources, especially Roman ones, which point to all the lengths senators would go to to achieve wealth, resorting to stealing land in proscriptions, committing fraud and other criminal offences. Cicero’s system of governance is much easier to maintain, and the competitive nature ensures that good politicians are in power but there is nothing truly preventing them from exploiting their position other than their own moral code. The Guardians of Plato’s Republic have no need to chase material wealth, all that is necessary is provided for them and they can fully dedicate themselves to the management and ruling of the state. However, the relationship of mutual benefit that exists between the Guardians and the providers is the essence that holds the entirety of the Republic together, and if the providers are no longer willing to provide for the Guardians, the system ultimately falls apart. If the goal of the enterprise is to produce better politicians who are less corrupt and more dedicated to their state, the abolishment of private property in favour of collective property is essential. The idea of removing the private property of politicians nowadays may seem unlawful and wrong, but it may still serve the purpose Plato wrote about in the Republic, and deter politicians seeking to use their positions to amass private wealth.
Works Cited
Cicero De Officiis, translated with an Introduction and Notes by Andrew P. Peabody (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1887).
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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